This paper investigates the relationship between housing prices and the quality of public schools in Australia. To disentangle the effects of schools and other neighbourhood characteristics on the value of residential properties, we compare sale prices of homes on either side of high school attendance boundaries in the Australian Capital Territory. We find that a 5 percent increase in test scores (approximately one standard deviation) is associated with a 3.5 percent increase in house prices. Our result is in line with private school tuition costs, and accords with prior research from Britain and the United States. Estimating the effect of school quality on house prices provides a possible measure of the extent to which Australian parents value better educational outcomes.
I.

INTRODUCTION
Parents deciding where to educate their child are frequently characterised as choosing between an expensive private school and a free public school. Yet if admission into the best public schools is limited, the quality of public schools may in fact be capitalised into the prices of houses in the neighbourhood. Just as house prices are higher when they are close to good parks, transport nodes and shops, might house prices also be affected by the quality of nearby schools?
To test this theory, we estimate the relationship between school quality and house prices in Australia. Three features of the Australia schooling system make it a useful counterpoint to the United States, on which most of the prior studies have focused.
First, parents in Australian schools have limited access to test score information with which to judge school performance, by contrast to the high-information regimes prevailing in the US. Second, the school boundaries that we study are "soft", meaning that being on the wrong side of the boundary does not prevent a child from attending school, but merely sends him or her to the bottom of the enrolment list. And third, the presence of a large non-government school sector means that there are more alternatives for parents who find themselves on the wrong side of the boundary. In theory, all of these factors should act to weaken the elasticity of house prices with respect to school quality. This paper provides the first empirical estimates of the relationship between school test scores and housing prices in Australia. Our approach exploits the sharp discontinuity of school boundaries. By comparing houses that are very close to one another but on opposite sides of a school attendance area boundary, we are able to hold constant neighbourhood characteristics, and obtain precise estimates of the effect of school quality on house prices.
To preview our results, we find that Australian parents do place a premium on public schools with higher test scores. Specifically, we find that a 5 percent increase in high school test scores (approximately one standard deviation) is associated with a 3.5 percent increase in house prices-or $12,985 at the median 2005 ACT house sale price. These results are robust to a number of sensitivity checks and corrections for potential omitted variable biases.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the literature on the relationship between school quality and housing prices. Section III provides background on the school system in the ACT. Section IV describes the data. Section V briefly outlines the chosen methodology. Section VI discusses the regression results. Section VII presents robustness checks. Section VII concludes and elaborates on the key policy implications of our findings.
II. PREVIOUS LITERATURE
In traditional hedonic pricing models, the sale price of a property is described as a function of the internal characteristics of the house as well as its location (Kain and Quigley, 1975; Li and Brown, 1980; Jud and Watts, 1981; Abelson 1997) . In such models, the price that is associated with each characteristic represents the marginal purchasers' valuation of that feature, with the parameter of interest being the proxy that is being used to operationalise school performance (Rosen, 1974) .
The first type of approach to estimating the effect of school quality on house prices is to use all houses in an area, and include a rich set of neighbourhood controls.
Examples of this type of approach include Weimer and Wolkoff (2001) and Cheshire and Sheppard (2002) . A related approach is that of Downes and Zabel (2002) , who estimate the relationship between changes in school quality and changes in house prices. The risk with such an approach is that the estimates may be biased in the presence of unmeasured neighbourhood quality effects.
A second empirical strategy is to exploit school boundary discontinuities. Black (1999) and Gibbons and Machin (2003) estimate a hedonic pricing function using data only from houses which are close to school attendance zone boundaries, thereby removing variation in neighbourhoods, taxes and school spending. 1 Gibbons and Machin (2006) show results using this approach, as well as a related strategy which involves assigning each property to '3-school clusters', and exploiting differences within clusters.
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A third set of studies use variation induced by natural experiments. Kane, Staiger, and Riegg (2005) property prices by raising school quality.
The fourth type of approach is that of Bayer, Ferreira and McMillan (2003) , who directly model the household sorting process, using an "optimal price instrument", which is based on the prices of houses more than 5 miles away. The intuition for this is that the prices of houses beyond this distance should not enter directly into the utility of homebuyers, but should nonetheless influence the equilibrium in the housing market, thereby affecting prices.
How large are the existing estimates of the effect of school quality on house prices? In Table I , we summarize the results from ten prior studies (4 from the United Kingdom and 6 from the United States). For reasons of comparability, we translate all studies to a common metric -the percentage effect on house prices of a one standard deviation increase in school quality. 4 This simplification does not take account of the nonlinearities identified by some studies (eg. Cheshire and Sheppard 2002; Bayer, Ferreira and McMillan 2003) , but does have the advantage of making the studies directly comparable. Where a study identifies a particular estimate as being preferred, we show that estimate; otherwise we show the range of estimates from the paper.
Overall, the United Kingdom estimates are very small for secondary schools (0.005 2 The UK estimates discussed here (Cheshire and Sheppard 2002; Machin 2003, 2006) are consistent with stated-preference studies. For example, one study recently found that parents from across England, Wales and Scotland would spend £15,000 extra, on average, on a new home to get their child into a better government school (BBC, 2006) . 3 This severing is predicted in the general equilibrium models of authors such as Nechyba (2003) , and Epple and Romano (1998) . 4 Full details of how the estimates for all studies were derived are available on request from the authors. and 0.05 percent), but primary school estimates are in the range of 2.1 and 10 percent, with a median around 4 percent. The United States estimates range from 1 to 14 percent, centred around 5 percent. 
BACKGROUND
The Australian Capital Territory (ACT), home to the Australian national capital, Canberra, is an ideal location to study the capitalization of school quality. Schools are funded at the Territory level, and are broadly subject to the same curricula, class size and administrative standards. This means all observations are subject to similar policy standards at any point in time. Moreover, enrolments in public schools are assigned on the basis of prospective students' residential addresses, with school attendance boundaries tending to be stable over time (DET, 2004) . Of all Australian States and Territories, the ACT also has the most socio-economically homogenous population, meaning that the estimates of the relationship between school quality and houses prices are less likely to pick up confounding unobserved neighbourhood characteristics (ABS, 2001a).
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The ACT government education system is normally split up into five phases: preschool, primary school (grades K-6), high school (grades 7-10) and college (grades 11-12), followed by studies at university. Most private high schools include years 11 and 12. Since the term "college" is more commonly used in the economics of education to denote part of a university, we refer to schools catering for years 11-12
as "high schools" throughout this paper, specifically referring to grade 7-10 high schools where necessary.
The ACT is a relatively high-income community, whose population is very well educated by national standards. 6 This suggests that there is likely to be a high premium placed on better school quality, as reflected by three qualitative aspects of the Territory's education system. First, Territory students of varied ages have a reputation for being some of the nation's highest achievers, recently outperforming 5 In conducting this research, it was suggested that we might also analyse the relationship in the state of Victoria. However, our preliminary investigations indicated several systematic factors that made this impractical. To assist other researchers, we have detailed these in an appendix to this paper. 6 As of May 2004, 30% of people in the ACT aged 15-64 had a level of educational attainment equal to at least an bachelor's degree, significantly higher that the national average of 19%. The ACT median weekly income for people aged over 15 was in the range $500-$599 well above the national average of $300-$399 (ABS, 2005 On one hand these factors might suggest that the marginal ACT parent is more 'willing to pay' for what they judge to be superior educational outcomes; yet on the other, the high proportion of students being educated outside of the public education system indicates that, for a significant minority of parents, the school their child attends is not necessarily determined by their home address, implying that there might be a limit on the capitalized price of school quality.
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At the same time, the amount of information about school quality which is publicly available to parents in the ACT is typically far less than in other jurisdictions, especially when compared with the US and UK, where most of the schoolcapitalization literature is grounded. 10 The ACT government's long-standing policy to prohibit the release of publication of school test score averages in reading and math from grades K-10 was recently upheld by a Review of Government School Reporting.
The report argued that the provision of school test score may "provide an inaccurate and misleading picture of school quality; lead to the construction of partial or full league tables of school results; and undermine effective school improvement" (GSEC 2003, 17) . The only comparative reporting which the review did sanction was the ongoing publication of overall median year 12 test score outcomes by school, currently 7 Results issued in 2005 for year 3, 5 and 7 students revealed ACT pupils topped the nation in four of nine categories. They scored highest when year 5 reading results were compared, and equal highest for year 3 numeracy and year 7 reading. (Bellamy, 2006) . 8 The percentage of students attending non-government schools is consistent across all year levels, with the exception of years 7-10, where the rate is 7 percentage points higher (ABS 2005). 9 Recent findings, for example, show that controlling for other relevant variables, on average, students at private schools outperform students in public schools (Marks 2005) . 10 In the UK and the US, school league tables are typically available on-line. In many cases, the databases can be searched by residential address. In the UK context, see www.dfes.gov.uk/performancetables/. For the US, see for example www.doe.mass.edu/mcas/.
published by the ACT Board of Senior Secondary Studies, and reproduced in midDecember in the ACT's daily newspaper, the Canberra Times.
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In light of recent findings that the greater the amount of information about school quality available to the public, the greater is the likely capitalization effect (Figlio and Lucas 2004 12 ), the ACT's restricted information regime is a further factor which might limit the capitalization of higher test score results in the Territory.
IV. DATA
The housing price data for this study come from allhomes.com.au, a rich interactive The houses in the sample were drawn randomly from streets that are within 800 meters of school attendance boundaries. As indicated above, public school students in the ACT complete years 11 and 12 in separate high schools. Given that the chosen measure of school quality for this study is year 12 test scores, the attendance boundaries which separate high school attendance zones thus function as the lines of demarcation around which the housing data was gathered. Figure I presents an example of an attendance boundary in the sample which separates two high schools.
11 While the data are released annually to the Canberra Times, they are not posted on the website of the ACT Department of Education and Training (given the volume of other material on that website, this appears to be a deliberate omission). In most other Australian states and territories, similar bans on reporting apply at the elementary school level. However, in some jurisdictions, information about year 12 results is more readily available. In Victoria, for example, each year, median results and percentage of each school's graduating class receiving Grade A, are published in the two major Melbourne newspapers. More recently, the State Government launched a website, On Track, which reports on the number of higher education offers extended to its graduating class (as a percentage); and the calibre of the offering institutions (4 year college versus 2 year college ). 12 Figlio and Lucas (2004) find that arbitrary distinctions embedded in "school report cards" lead to major housing price effects, even when taking into account the test scores or other variables used to construct these report card grades.
The solid line represents a high school attendance boundary and the light grey shading denotes the surrounding streets from which the property sales were randomly drawn.
Figure I: An Example of Two Contiguous High School Attendance Zones
All school zones boundaries for the ACT are shown in Figure II . Attendance boundaries are represented by the solid lines and high schools by dots. 13 The six boundaries that are included in this analysis are denoted by either stars or triangles (the difference is explained below). Figure II also reveals three additional pieces of information that shape the data sample. First, it is clear that some boundaries are divided by natural markers, such as large lakes or parklands. Because of concerns about neighbourhood differences on opposite sides of such an attendance boundary, boundaries which are formed in this way are excluded from the sample.
Second, not all boundaries are contiguous, meaning that there is not a designated school zone on either side of the boundary. This is especially true of boundaries on the outer perimeter of Figure II , which are at the urban fringe. Non-contiguous boundaries are also excluded from the sample. 13 Two dots in one attendance district reflect different campuses of the same school (Canberra High).
Third, in addition to separating the enrolment zones for grade 11-12 high schools, two boundaries in the sample (marked with triangles) also divide enrolment zones for grade 7-10 high schools. 14 Since test score information is not available at the grade 7-10 level, we do not believe this is likely to substantially bias our estimates.
However, it is worth noting the likely direction of the any bias. If the quality of grade 7-10 schools is positively correlated with the quality of grade 11-12 high schools, this will cause an upwards bias in our estimates, while if they are negatively correlated, this will lead to attenuation bias. Our measure of school quality is each school's median University Admissions Index (UAI). 16 The measure is derived from students' ongoing assignments and exams spanning through both years 11 and 12. The UAI ranks students on a nationallyequivalent scale out of 100. The scale is designed to allow comparisons within an age 16 Ideally, we would use a value-added measure of school performance, but none is available.
cohort (eg. a UAI of 75 means that the student is at the 75th percentile of his or her age cohort). Its main purpose is to allow universities to choose between applicants.
The Australian UAI carries more significance than final year exams in many other countries, as it is the sole criterion for entrance into most university courses.
In addition to being a standardized measure which is comparable across schools, evidence suggests that test scores-especially year 12 test scores-are a highly valued indicator of school quality. 17 A recent survey of high school students in the ACT found that "preparation for university entrance" was the primary reason why students chose to enrol in a government high school (DET, 2006) . 18 Even if parents are not considering test scores specifically when evaluating a high school but are instead looking at characteristics that are correlated with test scores, test scores will still be an appropriate measure. To reflect the information that parents had at their disposal, the tests scores assigned to each sale are those publicly reported in mid-December of the previous year.
The full sample includes 597 houses. These houses span six boundaries which capture the school attendance zones associated with each of the eight public high schools in the Territory. Table II 17 While not all students received a UAI score, the resulting bias on school-level achievement is likely to be small. The proportion of students not receiving a UAI at government schools is small (approximately 5 percentage points) and the schools with higher median UAIs report higher compliance rates. The bias is also difficult to sign. A low-drop out rate may mean that the school's real value-add is lower than a school with a high drop out rate. Alternatively, parents may prefer the lower dropout rate in its own right. 18 40 percent of students selected this option. Other possible answers included: "preparation for life and work, not just university" (6 percent); and "choice of vocational sources" (25 percent). 
V. ESTIMATION STRATEGY
To estimate the relationship between school quality and housing prices, we exploit boundary discontinuities. In essence, our strategy is similar to that of Black (1999) , in that we compare the prices of houses that are close to, but on opposite sides of, a school attendance boundary. By comparing a random sample of houses on opposite sides of a school attendance boundary, such an approach controls for unobserved neighbourhood characteristics that may be correlated with both school quality and house prices.
To isolate the effect of school quality on housing prices, we also control for a vector of other characteristics of the house, such as lot size and the number of bedrooms. A vector of quarter*year dummies are also added to control for the recent surge in housing prices in the ACT over the period under study. Including these additional variables, our main estimating equation is:
where ln(House Price) ijbt is the log price of house i in attendance zone j adjacent to boundary b at time t. Test jt is the median year 12 test score of the government high school in that attendance zone, X ijbt is a vector of house-specific characteristics, and Z ijb are a vector of neighbourhood characteristics. Ф b and γ t are boundary and time fixed effects, respectively. Table   III , the coefficient on test scores is positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent level, indicating that school quality has a significant impact on house prices. 19 The sample size is smaller than that for the full data set as some record units omit month of sale 20 When the relationship between test scores and housing prices is estimated, without boundary fixed effects, it is found that a one percentage point increase in test scores is associated with a 1.5 percent increase in housing values (t=4.4). This result is consistent with earlier literature relating house prices to test scores, which similarly finds that if one does not properly control for neighborhood characteristics, one will overestimate the capitalization of higher test scores into property prices (Black, 1999: 590, Kane, Staiger and Riegg, 2005: 16 Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
VI. MAIN RESULTS
VII. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
To test the robustness of the results presented in Table III , a number of sensitivity checks were performed. One issue of concern is the implied width of the attendance boundaries used in the sample. The key assumption of our estimation strategy is that unobserved neighbourhood quality is the same on the opposite sides of each attendance boundary. While looking at homes within a narrow band along attendance boundaries ensures that these neighbourhood qualities are most similar, using a wider band allows the use of more data, which provides for more precise estimates. To test whether houses on opposite sides of the boundaries in the sample are in fact similar in all respects other than in the high school to which they are assigned, we restrict our sample to houses that are closer to the attendance boundaries. The results are presented in Table IV. 21 Column (1) restricts the sample to parcels within 500 meters of the boundary, while column (2) Another issue of potential concern is that better schools may be located in better neighbourhoods. This may be especially true where a given boundary also represents 21 We do not include controls for number of bedrooms, bathrooms and parking spaces in the robustness checks, since these data are missing for a significant number of houses, and this would unduly restrict the sample size. 22 As a further check of sample selection, we weighted the boundaries evenly, to account for differences in the number of house sales around each boundary in the sample period. With such weighting, the coefficient on test scores increased to 0.09. However, in reality boundaries with more sales are conceivably longer boundaries, or those in more densely populated areas, and should therefore not be weighted evenly. a division between suburbs of different names, as happens along a number of boundaries in the sample. To the extent that neighbourhoods at or around the boundary edges go from bad to good, it is possible that capitalization observed at or around school attendance boundaries may be picking up not just differences in school quality, but also differences in neighbours. As a check to see whether this might be the case, we control for the percentage of the population in the postcode born overseas (since people may be willing to pay more for homogeneity or heterogeneity), and the log of the mean household income in the postcode (since people may be willing to pay more for richer neighbours). Columns (3) and (4) show the results from these specifications. Including percentage born overseas, the test score coefficient falls from 0.007 to 0.006, while adding an income control causes it to fall from to 0.004. Note that while the latter is a non-trivial decrease, including income may be regarded as "overcontrolling" (if school quality is a normal good, those who consume more of it will be richer). In any case, our estimate remains statistically significant at the 1 percent level, indicating that the capitalization estimate is not merely picking up differences in non-school neighbourhood characteristics.
Thus far, we have been using the previous year's test score as our measure of school quality. If underlying school quality changes little from year to year, then measurement error in the school quality variable may lead to attenuation bias (see Gibbons and Machin 2003 for a discussion of this issue). In such a case, a better metric may be the average test score over a number of years. In column (5), we therefore replace the annual test score coefficient with the average test score of the previous years' results. 23 We find that this increases our estimate of the relationship between school quality and house prices (the test score coefficient is 0.011). Whether this estimate should be preferred over our primary specification depends on whether underlying school quality (for which the annual test score is a noisy proxy) changes over a three-year period. If underlying school quality does not change at all over this interval, then the estimate of 0.011 should be preferred. However, we adopt a more cautious stance, and use 0.007 as our primary estimate, on the basis that true school quality may vary from year to year.
Does the willingness to pay for school quality vary across housing types? To test this, we interact the test score measure with the numbers of bedrooms in the house. Houses with more bedrooms are more likely to be owned by families with children who either have or will attend high school than those with few bedrooms; while houses with three or more bedrooms are also more likely to be the homes of families with multiple children. This suggests that the school quality premium may be higher for larger houses. 24 Because only a portion of the record units in the sample report on bedroom numbers, we subsequently predict the bedroom number for the full sample of houses, by regressing the lot-size of each property with a full set of reported characteristics on bedrooms (we do this on a boundary-by-boundary basis to account for the difference in subdivisions across different suburbs).
The results are presented in Table V . The first column reports on the samples where actual number of bedrooms is known, which accounts for only about half of the full sample. The coefficient on test scores interacted with houses with 3 or less bedrooms is higher than for the full sample (0.09), while that for houses with 4 of more bedrooms is lower but not statistically significant. To address the problem that the number of bedrooms is not known for many houses in the sample, the second column uses the full sample, but this time using the log of the lot size to predict the number of bedrooms (which is then rounded to the nearest integer). We then interact the test score coefficient with variables denoting whether the predicted number of bedrooms in a house is three or fewer, or four or more. The coefficient on test scores interacted with three or less bedrooms is similar to that for the full predicted sample (0.05) while, as expected, the coefficient on the interaction of test score and four or more bedrooms is higher (0.09). However, an F-test cannot reject the hypothesis that the effect of school quality on house prices does not vary by house size. Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Number of predicted bedrooms are rounded to the nearest integer.
VIII. MAGNITUDE OF RESULTS AND A COMPARISON WITH PRIVATE SCHOOL TUITION
Our preferred estimate of the impact of school quality on house prices (column 1 of from Table III 25 All else being equal, parents would need to pay approximately 2.5 percent more to move from a bottom quartile school zone to a top quartile school 25 Our median house price is from ABS (2006, In the context of the ACT, such a comparison is complicated by two factors however.
First, the comparison assumes that the tuition fee savings are realizable for the full length of the home loan. In fact, these savings are only likely to be realized as long as the child is in high school-which in the ACT is only two years. 29 Second, with only two exceptions (Marist College and St. Francis Xavier College), all non-government schools in the ACT which charge average tuition fees (ie $4777) produce test score results which are no better than that of the average public schools. As discussed immediately below, parents would typically need to pay higher fees to access superior private schools, and thus $4777 may not be an accurate capital cost benchmark. 26 Note that while Black's estimate of the capitalization rate per standard deviation is 2.5%, she finds that a move from a school in the 25 th percentile of her sample to one in the 7 th percentile would result in a house price increase of 2.9 percent. 27 The estimate of average private school tuition fees is based on data from the Good Schools Guide NSW and ACT 2005, supplemented where necessary by telephone calls to school administrators. 28 Kane, Steiger and Riegg reach a relatively similar conclusion. Specifically, they find that an upper limit to a family's willingness to pay for a good school of U$120,000 in additional mortgage value, compared with only $14,000 difference in house prices between schools at the 25 th and 75 th percentiles. 29 Although enrolment in some private middle schools, which include years 11 and 12, require that the child be enrolled from year 7 onwards. In this situation, the implied savings from not sending a child to a private school would span 6 years.
In light of these complications, Figure $2,000 $3,000 $4,000 $5,000 $6,000 $7,000 $8,000 $9,000 $10,000 $11,000 $12,000 Our findings provide Australian policymakers with the means by which to assess the net benefit of various policies designed to improve the performance of public schools.
The costs associated with a proposal aimed at raising the test score standards at public schools can now be usefully pitted against the social benefit evaluation of the intended policy outcome. With such rational social accounting practices, education policy makers should be better placed to maximize social welfare.
The results carry other key policy implications. Since houses in better school zones are more expensive high-quality public education is not costless. The price of buying into a good school zone may prevent poor families from accessing the public schools of their choice. Given that education can transform the social and economic opportunities of the underprivileged, such social exclusion may perpetuate cycles of disadvantage if left unaddressed. To the extent that the achievement gap between schools is driven by inherent school quality more than it is by peers, our findings suggest that in order to equalize education opportunities, government funding should be directed towards schools with less talented teachers and substandard facilities.
Our results also imply that the wealth effects of raising school quality may be large.
At the median house price, we find that a 5 percentage point rise in ACT test scores In light of this relatively expansive information regime, an initial attempt was made to estimate that capitalization of school quality in Victoria. However, this proved unworkable. Unlike the ACT, a parent in Victoria is entitled to send their child to any school of their choosing. In only a few circumstances is attendance at high school determined by residential address, typically where demand for a high school exceeds its capacity. Moreover, where such 'enrolment ceilings' are in place, clearly-defined attendance boundaries are often not used. To give school administrators greater discretion, school district bodies sanction the allocation of places on a 'straight line basis', whereby the school to which a student is applying must be the nearest one to their home, based on a straight-line measurement. In two instances, contiguous clearly-defined attendance boundaries are used; however even in these cases institutional arrangements are problematic. Attendance boundaries are either not made available to the public and/or they are officially subject to change without notice
